DOI: 10.22394/2500-1809-2024-9-1-39-53
The article considers the peasant unrest in the North-West of Russia during the cholera epidemic. In the summer of 1831, after the mass outflow of workers from Saint Petersburg due to the cholera riots, a wave of peasant protests swept through Saint Petersburg and Olonets provinces: local residents attacked doctors and government officials, accusing them of abusing power and of poisoning the people under the pretext of fighting the epidemic. Such peasant revolts caused serious concern to the authorities that paid special attention to the population behavior during the epidemic. The distinctive feature of the peasant unrest was a gradual shift of its epicenter to the east along waterways — rivers and canals of the Mariinsky system. Peasant revolts were caused by a combination of factors that had both a nationwide nature and local specifics. The first important factor was rumors of poisoning that spread throughout the Mariinsky water system and its surroundings from Saint Petersburg due to its cholera riots. The second important factor were waterways that allowed people and rumors to travel relatively quickly over long distances. The third important factor was social distrust to authorities, doctors and anti-epidemic measures. The peasant unrest was a part of Russia’s cholera riots in the summer of 1831.
Peasant unrest, epidemic, cholera, rumors, poisoning, panic, violence, communication, communication lines.
Alexander K. Egorov, PhD (History), Associate Professor, Petrozavodsk State University. Lenin St., 33, Petrozavodsk, 185910; Research Fellow, Institute of Linguistics, Literature and History, Karelian Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Pushkinskaya St.,11, Petrozavodsk, 185910.
E-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
The article was submitted on 11.12.2023.
DOI: 10.22394/2500-1809-2017-2-2-90-100
The article considers the applicability of game theory for the study of conflicts in peasant communes in the first half of the XX century. Game theory models can explain peasant motives and behavior and reconstruct the decision-making in the commune under the conflict. Game theory can become a part of the historical analysis for it is an interdisciplinary approach that can reveal the logic of endogenous behavior within the commune and its interaction with external institutions and actors. The author provides different definitions of game theory and considers its potential for the analysis of peasant life. The article defines principles and prerequisites for constructing a mathematical model of the peasant commune behavior under the conflict, and factors that motivate peasants to follow a certain line of actions and to choose specific strategies in different situations. The main problem of the game model is the dependence of each ‘player’ on the actions of other ‘players’. The author presents a cognitive mathematical model based on the clash of interests of a manager (willing to increase economic efficiency) and a commune (willing to ensure justice on the principles of a moral economy and ethics of survival). Thus, the author identifies transactional and information functions of peasant revolts.
peasant community, game theory, conflict, revolution, frankpledge, mathematical model, violence, survival ethics
Shornikov Evgeny I., Postgraduate Student, School of Public Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. Russia, 119571, Moscow, prosp. Vernadskogo, 82.
E-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.