EDN: GEDQPV
The author applies T. Shanin’s concept of expolar economy to analyze the ways in which the collective-farm village adapted to the new round of the state mobilization policy in 1939–1953. The article presents various ways of craft resources “penetration” (including land, money, labor and draught power, inventory, equipment, machinery, livestock and all kinds of agricultural products) into the informal sector. They were unevenly redistributed among many “recipients” — local government structures, individual officials, non-agricultural enterprises, top management of collective farms, and peasants. The informal economy provided the state with an invaluable service by compensating for the shortcomings of centralized management, eliminating the gaps in the goods exchange between the city and the countryside, thus reducing the severity of food crisis and shortages of goods in both urban and rural areas. Resources outside the state control allowed collective farms to perform social assistance functions that the state did not provide to the peasantry. The collective-farm economy was rooted in the peasant social life. The expolar ties that held the collective-farm society together helped peasants survive under the aggressive mobilization policies of the state.
Collective farms, peasantry, survival, adaptation, agrarian policy, mobilization.
Sergey V. Sharapov, PhD (History), Researcher, Institute of History, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Nikolaeva St., 8, Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia.
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DOI: 10.22394/2500-1809-2023-8-1-67-84
On the example of the Novosibirsk Region, the author considers the features of the interaction of local authorities and collective farms during the war. The contradiction, which regional and district authorities faced, was that the total mobilization of resources by the central authorities threatened the local social-economic situation. Therefore, the decisions and actions of the local authorities became contradictory as they had to compensate for the damage caused by their efforts to seize agricultural products from collective farms. Moreover, there were corrupt motives as very common for the relations between the authorities and collective farms. In most cases, collective-farm peasants responded to the obviously excessive state demands by inaction, which forced the local authorities to show additional efforts in order to make agricultural producers fulfill the state requirements. The complexity of the agrarian agenda diverted the attention of the party and governing bodies. However, the state activities were still insufficient to keep the collective farm production under constant control.
Agrarian policy of the Soviet state, Great Patriotic War, collective farms, mobilization, trusteeship, corruption.
Sergey V. Sharapov, PhD (History), Researcher, Institute of History, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Nikolaeva St., 8, Novosibirsk, 630090.
E-mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.